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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURES IN STRICT LIABILITY ACTIONS:
SOME SUGGESTIONS REGARDING
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
Subsequent remedial measures such as repairs, changes of condition,
or precautions taken by a defendant after an injury traditionally have
not been admissible when offered as evidence to prove the defendant's
negligence or culpability in causing the injury.' Rule 407 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence codifies the common law' rule excluding evidence of
I See, e.g., Columbia & P. S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (taking
precautions against future not construed as admission of responsibility for past); Stephen v.
Merlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965) (evidence of subsequent repair not ad-
missible to prove negligence); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 302 F.2d 389, 390 (6th Cir. 1962)
(defendant's change in product design after accident not admissible as proof of alleged
negligence before and at time of accident); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,
224 F.2d 120, 130 (6th Cir. 1955) (modifications by defendant after discovery of damage not
properly admissible on issue of ordinary care). The exclusionary rule for subsequent repair
evidence is so well settled that one commentator explaining the rule stated that citation of
authority was unnecessary. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
EVIDENCE 185 (5th ed. J. Weinstein 1976); accord, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. American
Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683, 690 (5th Cir. 1963).
1 FED. R. Evm. 407; see, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (common law rule excludes subsequent remedial measures
to prove negligence); Harwood v. Chaney, 156 F.2d 392, 392 (8th Cir. 1946) (evidence of tak-
ing additional precautions after accident not admissible to prove negligence at time of acci-
dent); Burch v. Levy Bros. Box Co., 47 Cal. App. 2d 1041, , 117 P.2d 435, 436-37 (1941)
(fact of remedial activity incompetent and immaterial); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 186 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LEMPERT & SALTZBURG]
(federal rule declaratory of common law); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 407 [01], at 407-5 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] (Rule 407
codifies almost uniform practice of American courts to exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial measures as proof of admission of fault); Kennelly, Postaccident Remedial
Measures (Federal Rule of Evidence 407)-Suggested Discovery and Methods to Establish
Admissibility, 21 TRIAL L. GUIDE 61, 61 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kennelly] (Rule 407
codifies state case law); Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs-A Rule
in Need of Repair, 7 FORUM 1, 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz] (exclusion of post-
accident remedial activity in accord with law in most states). Many states have adopted by
statute Rule 407 or a rule substantially similar. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. R. EvID. 407
(1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001, R. 407 (1976); COLO. R. EvID. 407 (1980); MICH. R. EVID. 407
(1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. EvID. R. 407 (1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-3002 R. Evm. 407
(Cumin. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (Cumin. Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.095
(1977); N.M.R. EVID. 407 (1978); N.D.R. EvID. 407 (1977); S.D.R. EviD. § 19-12-9 (Supp. 1978);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-418.1 (Cumin. Supp. 1978); WASH. R. Evm. 407 (1982); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.07 (West 1975); Wyo. R. EvID. 407 (1978). A notable exception is Maine Rule of
Evidence 407(a). See ME. R. EvID. 407(a) (1976). Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) declares that
evidence of subsequent measures taken after an event is admissible to prove negligence or
culpable conduct. See id.; Note, The Repair Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negligence, 27 ME. L. REV.
225, 226 (1975). See also text accompanying note 41 infra.
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subsequent remedial measures3 to prove negligence or culpable conduct.'
While Rule 407 contains several exceptions that permit admission of
subsequent repair evidence for limited purposes,5 most commentators
agree that the general exclusion of subsequent repair evidence in
negligence actions is sound.' The need to exclude subsequent repair
evidence in actions that do not require a determination of negligence,
however, is less clear.7 A standard of strict tort liability requires no
showing of negligence,' and stands on proof and policy considerations
significantly different from those supporting a negligence theory.'
Courts disagree whether the rule excluding evidence of subsequent
repairs extends to actions in strict liability.'" Without uniform court
I See FED. R. EVID. 407. The phrase "remedial measures" in Rule 407 brings within
the scope of the rule any post-accident change, repair, or precaution. See WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 407 [01], at 407-5. Evidence of remedial measures also includes
evidence of subsequent installation of safety devices, changes in design; recall letters, addi-
tional warnings, changes in company rules, changes in product labelling, packaging or
advertising, changes in the choice of materials or components, and discharge of employees.
See Note, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule: Admission of Evidence of Subsequent
Repairs against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 135, 135
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Renovated Repair Rule].
' FED. R. EvID. 407. The subsequent remedial measures rule provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id.
, FED. R. EVID. 407; see Patrick v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 648 F.2d 1192, 1196 (6th
Cir. 1980) (Rule 407 allows admission of subsequent repair evidence for purposes of proof of
ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, and impeach-
ment); text accompanying notes 28-30 infra; note 4 supra.
' See Schwartz, supra note 2, at 2; e.g., C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 275 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK] (evidence of remedial safety measures taken after injury
excluded when offered as admission of negligence or fault); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 283 (J.
Chadbourn ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] (same); Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Af-
fecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 574, 590-91 (1956) (same). But see ME. R. EVID.
407(a) (evidence of repairs after event admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct).
The bases of the general rule excluding subsequent repair evidence are relevancy and
public policy. See Lloyd, Admissibility of Evidence of Post-Accident Repairs: The Graying
of a Black-Letter Rule, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 400, 400 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Lloyd]; text ac-
companying note 19 infra.
See text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
See Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability Law,
20 DRAKE L. REV. 528, 528 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Carmichael]. Strict liability in tort im-
poses liability for damages on a person without requiring proof of negligence or fault. Id.
See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 494 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
See note 127 infra.
, See Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304, 1309 n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting conflict
among circuits); Costello & Weinberger, The Subsequent Repair Doctrine and Products
Liability, 51 N.Y. ST. B. J. 463, 463 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Subsequent Repair Doctrine]
1416 [Vol. 39:1415
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
treatment of repair evidence in strict liability actions, producers and
manufacturers defending strict liability claims find their products
assessed differently from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." The disparate
treatment of subsequent repair evidence is anomalous when a stated
purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence is fairness in the administra-
tion of evidence law,12 and the legislative intent is uniformity of evidence
rules used in the federal circuits.1
3
Absent the exclusionary rule, plaintiffs in tort actions would in-
troduce subsequent repair evidence as an implied admission of the defen-
dant of his culpability with respect to the injury. 4 Supporting the admis-
(indicating controversy over subsequent repair exclusion); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence
407 and Its State Variations: The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent Remedial Measures"
of Their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49 U. Mo. K.C. L. REV. 338, 350-51 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as State Variations] (decisive split of authority in jurisdictions ruling on
applicability of Rule 407 in products liability cases). Some judges and commentators note
the distinctions between theories of negligence and strict liability, but nevertheless extend
the rule excluding evidence of subsequent repair to strict liability actions. See, e.g., Cann v.
Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (distinction between negligence and strict pro-
ducts liability causes of action does not justify admission of evidence); Oberst v. Interna-
tional Harv. Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980) (exclusion of post-accident change from
trial not reversible error); Note, Ault v. International Harvester Co.-Death Knell to the
Exclusionary Rule Against Subsequent Remedial Conduct in Strict Products Liability, 13
SAN. DIEGO L. REV. 208, 224 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Death Knell] (considerations war-
rant application of exclusionary rule to strict products liability). Conversely, others have
viewed the distinction as sufficient to render the rule inapplicable when the theory of
recovery is strict liability. See text accompanying notes 58-60 infra; e.g., Farner v. Paccar,
Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977) (rule prohibiting admission of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures does not apply to actions based on strict liability); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of remedial activity
by defendant admissible with respect to plaintiff's strict liability claim); Note, Products
Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 849-50 [hereinafter cited
as Products Liability] (evidence of subsequent repair should be admissible in strict liability
actions to be consistent with policy of strict liability).
" See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 141. Products liability law needs unifor-
mity and stability because products liability insurance rates are set on a nationwide basis.
See Department of Commerce, Introduction, MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979). Product sellers and insurers, therefore, need to know the rules by
which courts will judge products liability. Id. Courts should hold manufacturers to a uniform
duty of care no matter where they market their goods, as product distribution flows freely
over jurisdictional lines. See Note, Post-Accident Design Modification and Strict Products
Liability in New York, 45 ALB. L. REV. 386, 408 (1981).
" See FED. R. EVID. 102 (rules construed to secure fairness of administration, elimina-
tion of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of
evidence law). One commentator recently has noted that the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Evidence seems to have contributed to a growing consistency among the various circuits
and among states under similar rules, although to date the circuits and states have not
achieved uniformity. Rothstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence: Six Years After, 28 FED.
BAR NEWS & J. 282, 282 (1981).
" See 120 CONG. REC. 1412 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate) & 1413 (remarks of Reps.
Hutchinson and Smith) (purpose of bill to provide uniformity with the Federal Rules of
Evidence so that same rules will apply throughout all circuits).
11 See RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 111 (2d
1982] 1417
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sion of subsequent repair evidence is the general policy of the adversary
system of justice and the law of evidence, which is to place before the
trier of fact all facts necessary for proper determination of the issues in
controversy."5 Although a plaintiffs remedial measures could be cogent
evidence of elements of negligence, 6 two reasons support the traditional
rule that excludes the evidence."' First, evidence of remedial measures
frequently is irrelevant to the issue of negligence." A defendant's subse-
quent repair activity often stems from reasons unrelated to the
negligence issue, rather than from a defendant's belief in his own
negligence." Many post-accident changes reflect new technology or are
made because of economic reasons." Moreover, because a finding of
ed. P. Rothstein 1981) [hereinafter cited as Rothstein] (stimulus for remedial measure may
be feeling of culpability, if so evidence of measure like an implied admission); S. SALTZBURG
& K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 181 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
SALTZBURG & REDDEN] (without Rule 407 exclusion lawyers would use post-accident repair
to promote inference of negligence).
" See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (need to develop all relevant
facts in adversary system both fundamental and comprehensive); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (public has right to every man's evidence); LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra
note 2, at 140 (evidence rules judged on whether they increase chance jury will reach cor-
rect verdict); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code of Evidence, 89 U. PA.
L. REV. 145, 150-51 (1940) (testimonial privilege based on conviction that benefit to social in-
terest from suppression of evidence outweights harm done in investigation of particular
disputes); Note, Post-Accident Repairs and Offers of Compromise: Shaping Exclusionary
Rules to Public Policy, 10 Loy. CHI. L.J. 487, 487 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Post-Accident
Repairs] (provide trier of fact with as much evidence as possible to ensure proper issue
determination).
" See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 30, at 143. Traditionally, the requisite elements of a
negligence cause of action include a duty recognized by law that requires a defendant to con-
form to a certain standard of conduct for protection of others against unreasonable risk,
failure of the defendant to conform to the required standard, a causal connection between
the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury, and actual loss or damage to the plaintiffs
interests. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT].
" See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 187; Products Liability, supra note 10,
at 840; Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 407; text accompanying notes 18-26 infra.
" See Columbia & P. S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (remedial
measures have no legitimate tendency to prove defendant's negligence before accident);
Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Clem., 123 Ind. 15, 17, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890) (only activities occurr-
ing before accident determine defendant's culpable breach of duty); Morse v. Minneapolis &
S.L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 468, 16 N.W. 358, 359 (1883) (evidence of subsequent repair affords no
legitimate basis for admission of previous neglect of duty); WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 283 (im-
provement of injury causing object indicates object capable of injury and nothing more).
'" See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 149; Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co.,
89 Wash. 2d 474, 483, 573 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1978) (subsequent change sometimes im-
plemented to improve product for reasons other than to cure dangerous defect).
See Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 125-26, 528 P.2d 1148, 1156, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812, 820 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting); Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at
149. Post-accident repair might arise from a defendant's extreme caution. Columbia & P. S.
R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 208 (1892). Post-accident repair also could result from a
defendant's feeling that such repair socially was desirable or humane. See 13 Cal. 3d at 125,
1418 [Vol. 39:1415
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
negligence in part rests upon the failure of a defendant to foresee the
potential harm of the injury causing object, it is occurrences happening
prior to the injury, not afterwards, that determine negligence.2 ' A defen-
dant's subsequent repair activities often stem from his discovery or
realization that the object is capable of causing harm, rather than his
negligence in failing to foresee the harm.22 Second, and more
importantly," a jury might view remedial repair evidence as an admis-
sion of legal fault by a defendant,24 with the effect of discouraging a
defendant from repair for fear that he would provide evidence for a
potential plaintiff.' The policy behind the rule excluding evidence of
remedial repair is to encourage the defendant to repair and improve
528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Clark, J., dissenting). Moreover, evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures may reflect only the defendant's opinion that he has been
negligent or could have been more cautious and not his negligence under a legal standard.
WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 283.
2 PROSSER, supra note 8, § 31, at 146; WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 283, at 174-75; see, e.g.,
Columbia & P. S. R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (taking of precautions against
the future has no legitimate tendency to prove negligence before accident); Terre Haute &
I. R.R. v. Clem., 123 Ind. 15, 19, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890) (occurrences prior to action deter-
mine culpable breach of duty). Evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not necessarily
an admission of negligence because such measures are consistent equally with injury by ac-
cident or through contributory negligence. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. Evm.
407. The rule excluding subsequent repair evidence rejects the notion that "because the
world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before." See id. (quoting Hart v.
Lancashire & Y. Ry., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 283 (1869)).
'2See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14, at 181; Products Liability, supra note 10,
at 840.
" See McCoRMICK, supra note 6, § 275, at 668; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
407 [02], at 407-9. Courts have recognized the public policy grounds for excluding evidence of
subsequent repair as controlling. See Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir.
1974); Kovacs v. Sun Valley Co., 499 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1974); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Williams, 370 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1966). The rationale of relevancy alone would not
always be sufficient to support exclusion of subsequent repair evidence. See Advisory Com-
mittee's Note, FED. R. Evm. 407; WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 283; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 3;
Post-Accident Repairs, supra note 15, at 487-88.
U See Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 126, 528 P.2d 1148, 1156, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 820 (1974) (Clark, J., dissenting) (jury may conclude change reflects admission of
negligence and give decisive weight to perceived admission); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v.
Chapman, __ Ind. App. -, , 388 N.E.2d 541, 561 (1979) (jury might apply ar-
tificially high standard if influenced by subsequent repair evidence); Products Liability,
supra note 10, at 841 (jury might construe defendant's repair making as admission of
negligence); Note, Exclusion of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs in Drug Products Liability
Actions-An Unnecessary Resurrection of an Obsolete Rule, 31 MERCER L. REV. 801, 803
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Exclusion of Evidence] (observing that courts have noted juries
not capable of construing subsequent repair evidence in any way other than admission of
negligence or liability).
11 See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (people loath to take ac-
tions that increase risk of losing lawsuit); Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Clem., 123 Ind. 15, 19, 23
N.E. 965, 966 (1890) (repairers should not fear that evidence of repair will amount to admis-
sion of wrongdoing); WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 283.
1982] 1419
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without apprehension that remedial actions will later harm him in a
lawsuit.
6
While relevancy and public policy considerations have promoted a
general exclusionary rule barring evidence of subsequent remedial
repair to show negligence or culpable conduct, the rule is not absolute,
with both the common law and Rule 407 recognizing a number of excep-
tionsY Consistent with the common law, Rule 407 excludes evidence of
subsequent repair only when offered to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with some event.' Rule 407 explicitly allows in-
troduction of evidence showing subsequent remedial measures as proof
of ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if con-
' See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1980) (rule including subse-
quent repair evidence designed to protect policy encouraging defendants to repair); Farner
v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977) (policy behind rule encourages defen-
dant to remedy dangerous condition without fear remedial measure will indicate admission
of fault). The policy argument encouraging post-accident repair has come to dominate the
relevancy argument in excluding evidence of such repair. See note 23 supra.
' Kennelly, supra note 2, at 67-69 (prior to Rule 407 post-accident changes admissible
for multiple reasons); FED. R. EVID. 407 (subsequent remedial measures not excluded when
offered to prove ownership, control, feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted,
or impeachment). Prior to the adoption of Rule 407 in 1975, courts admitted evidence of
post-accident changes to rebut and impeach, show the defendant had notice of a prior defect,
establish the defendant's duty to make repairs, show repairs made by a third party,
demonstrate conditions existing at the time of the accident, and establish a cause of action.
See, e.g., Choctaw, 0. & G. R.R. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64, 69 (1903) (no error in trial court ad-
mitting evidence of subsequent repair to rebut defendant's evidence); Kovacs v. Sun Valley
Co., 499 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th Cir. 1974) (subsequent repair evidence under Idaho law admissi-
ble only when question of defendant's duty at issue); Bailey v. Kawasaki Kisen, K.K., 455
F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1972) (evidence of subsequent corrective measures admissible to
demonstrate condition at time of injury); Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d
1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969) (evidence of subsequent repair properly admitted to show control);
Fine v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 231, 236-37 (D.D.C. 1958) (evidence of subse-
quent changes admissible to show injury brought about in manner alleged and to show ex-
isting conditions at time of injury); Harig v. McCutcheon, 23 Ohio App. 500, 503, 155 N.E.
701, 702 (1926) (admission of testimony regarding subsequent remedial activity erroneous
unless limited to show defendant's notice of prior defect). Contra, Laurenzi v. Vranigan, 25
Cal. 2d 806, 812-13, 155 P.2d 633, 637 (1945) (subsequent repair evidence excluded because
would not prove knowledge prior to accident). Additionally, when controverted by the
defendant, evidence of post-accident changes may show the feasibility of preventive
measures and defendant's ownership and control. See, e.g., Woolard v. Mobil Pipe Line Co.,
479 F.2d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 1973) (evidence of remedial alterations admissible with limiting in-
struction to show defendant's control); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315 (9th
Cir. 1961) (evidence of subsequent changes may be admitted for limited purpose of showing
practicability of use of safeguard). Before the adoption of Rule 407 many federal courts
allowed evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show the difference between condi-
tions at the time of the accident and those at the time of the trial. See United States v.
Norfolk-Berkley Bridge Corp., 29 F.2d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 1928) (evidence of subsequent
alteration admissible to show condition at time of accident); O'Brien v. Las Vegas & T. R.R.,
242 F. 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1917) (evidence of repairs admissible to show condition at time of ac-
cident).
I See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 186.
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troverted, or for impeachment purposes.' Courts and commentators
have construed the exceptions explicitly allowed by Rule 407 to be ex-
amples rather than an exhaustive list of permitted purposes, implying
the admissibility of subsequent repair evidence for other purposes."0
Several courts have held that strict liability claims constitute yet
another exception through which evidence of subsequent repair becomes
admissible."1 Given the differing elements required to sustain theories of
negligence32 and of strict liability,33 controversy arises over whether the
rule excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures used to prove
negligence or culpable conduct should apply to strict tort liability ac-
tions. 4 Although strict liability eliminates the necessity to prove
negligence, a plaintiff in a strict liability action still has the burden to
establish that the defendant's product caused the injury, the product
was defective or unreasonably unsafe, and the defect existed when the
product left the hands of the particular defendant. 5 At issue in a strict
FED. R. Evm. 407 (reprinted in note 4 supra); see Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596
F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of subsequent remedial activity admissible to show
feasibility of precautionary measures if controverted); Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp.
172,177 (D. Mass. 1978) (evidence of subsequent repair activity admissible under Rule 407 as
probative on issue of feasibility of alternative measures); Doyle v. United States, 441 F.
Supp. 701, 709 (D. S.C. 1977) (same). The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 407 adds proof
of duty to the list of purposes for which courts may admit proof of subsequent remedial
measures. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 407.
1 See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980) (exceptions listed in Rule
407 illustrative and not exhaustive); FED. R. EVID. 407 (reprinted in note 4 supra); Note, Ad-
missibility of Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 671,
677 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Remedial Measures] (exceptions listed in Rule 407 il-
lustrative, not exhaustive). The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 407 in-
dicates that a defendant can offer evidence of subsequent measures only for purposes other
than as proof of negligence or culpable conduct. See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R.
EVID. 407. Courts accordingly have been willing to admit subsequent repair evidence under
Rule 407 for a range of purposes other than as proof of negligence or culpable conduct. See,
e.g., Patrick v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 641 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1980) (evidence of
restoring to pre-accident condition); Kenny v. Southeastern Pac. Transp. Auth., 581 F.2d
351, 356 (3d Cir. 1978) (subsequent repair evidence used for rebuttal); Farner v. Paccar, Inc.,
562 F.2d 518, 525 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977) (dictum) (subsequent repair made by party other than
defendant).
31 See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 792-93 (8th Cir. 1977)
(subsequent remedial warning admissible against cattle feed manufacturer in strict liability
action); Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1153, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 814 (1974) (manufacturer's subsequent change of metal used in gear box admissi-
ble in strict liability); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 870, 875 (1976)
(General Motor's issuance of recall letters after accident admissible in strict liability claim).
32 See note 16 supra.
See text accompanying note 35 infra.
See Subsequent Repair Doctrine, supra note 8, at 463 (indicating controversy over
subsequent repair exclusion); Products Liability, supra note 10, at 855 (evidence of subse-
quent repair should be admissible in strict liability actions to be consistent with policy of
strict liability); Death Knell, supra note 10, at 224 (several considerations warrant applica-
tion of exclusionary rule to strict products liability); text accompanying notes 38-42 infra.
" See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 103, at 671-72. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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products liability action, therefore, is the character of the defendant's
product and not the defendant's conduct or culpability." Since Rule 407
speaks only of negligence or culpable conduct, the argument runs, then
Rule 407 should not apply to exclude subsequent repair evidence in
strict products liability actions."
Despite the shift of focus of proof, however, most courts continue to
exclude subsequent repair evidence in strict liability actions.' Courts
following the majority view discern the distinction between tort actions
that require a showing of negligence and strict liability actions to be in-
sufficient to merit the exclusionary rule inapplicable. 9 Several courts,
OF TORTS defines strict tort liability such that a seller of a dangerous or defective product
will be liable for the physical harm to the consumer from the product if the defect was the
proximate cause of the injury, the seller was in the business of selling the product, and the
seller intends and the product does reach the consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which the product is sold. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 402A. Many
courts have adopted widely § 402A as a description of the rules of strict tort liability. See
Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 136 n.6." See generally Dickerson, The ABC's of
Product Liability- With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439,
442 (1969).
- See, e.g., Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d
749, 753 (1972) (shift of emphasis from defendant manufacturer's conduct to character of pro-
duct); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 7, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (1976) (negligence action
deals with defendant's conduct, strict liability action with the product); Shaffer v.
Honeywell, Inc., 61 S.D. , ., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (1976) (products liability
case looks to defect in product rather than culpable act by manufacturer). At least one court
has noted, however, that a suit brought under either strict liability or negligence theories
seeks damages from the manufacturer, not the product. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,
857 (4th Cir. 1980).
11 See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir.
1977) (Rule 407 does not bar subsequent remedial activity evidence in strict liability case
because rule expressly applies only to proof of negligence or culpable conduct); Abel v. J.C.
Penney Co., 488 F. Supp. 891, 896 (D. Minn. 1980) (dictum) (Rule 407 not applicable to pro-
ducts liability cases).
I See, e.g., Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (subse-
quent repair evidence excluded because feasibility exception not met); Ramos v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (Rule 407 requires exclusion of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove negligence or culpable
conduct); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979) (evidence of subsequent
repair excluded because did not come within any exception); Holbrook v. Koehring Co., 75
Mich. App. 592, -, 255 N.W.2d 698, 699 (1977) (not error for trial court to exclude
evidence of subsequent remedial repairs); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d
474, 483, 573 P.2d 785, 791 (1978) (rejects rule of universal admissibility of post-injury
changes to prove prior defect); Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 155. But see text ac-
companying note 40 infra.
I See, e.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (failure of Rule 407 to
refer explicitly to actions in strict liability does not prevent its application to such actions,
common law principles apply to fill gaps in Federal Rules of Evidence); Oberst v. Interna-
tional Harv. Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting theory that evidence of subse-
quent repair would be admissible for any purpose in a strict liability action); Werner v. Up-
john Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980) (from policy standpoint if rule expressly excludes
evidence of subsequent repairs to prove culpable conduct same should be true for strict
liability); Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (public policy
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however, have refused to allow the application of the negligence-based
exclusionary rule in strict liability actions." At least six states admit
evidence of remedial repairs offered to prove the existence of a defect as
part of the plaintiffs case in chief.4' In addition, federal courts have split
over Rule 407's applicability to strict liability actions.42
The initial difficulty in determining the applicability of Rule 407 to
justification of encouraging subsequent repair may be less forceful for mass-produced items
but still deserves some weight).
" See, e.g., Unterberger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980) (Rule 407 not ap-
plicable to strict liability actions); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788, 792 (8th Cir. 1977) (evidence of remedial warning admissible in plaintiff's strict liability
claim); Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 121, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 812, 816 (1974) (difference in focus of proof in products liability case makes subsequent
repair'admissible); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d
749, 753 (1972) (post-accident change relevant and material); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 61
S.D. , - 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (1976) (evidence of post-accident remedial ac-
tions admissible because different standard of proof in products liability cases). Even if Rule
407 did not exclude evidence of subsequent repair, the evidence would still have to be rele-
vant and not unfairly prejudicial to be admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 402 & 403; text accom-
panying notes 113-115 infra. At least two commentators have discerned a trend or tendency
by courts expressly considering admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs in strict
liability to reject the importation of the exclusionary rule from the negligence field. See
Rothstein, supra note 14, at 114; Lloyd, supra note 6, at 408.
41 See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 793 (Alaska 1981) (approving
Alaska R. Evid. 407 which explicitly admits evidence of subsequent measures to prove
defective condition in a products liability action); Burke v. Almaden Vineyards, Inc., 86 Cal.
App. 3d 768, 774, 150 Cal. Rptr. 418, 422 (1978) (trial judge has discretion to allow admission
of subsequent warning where probative value outweighs prejudicial effect); Good v. A.B.
Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 79, 565 P.2d 217, 224 (1977) (application of exclusionary rule
contrary to public policy encouraging distributor of mass-produced goods to market safer
products, evidence of post-accident warnings had direct bearing on liability issue); McCaf-
frey v. Illinois C. G. R.R., 71 Ill. App. 3d 42, 50, 388 N.E.2d 1062, 1069 (1979) (since product
bears scrutiny in strict products liability and not conduct of manufacturer in producing pro-
duct, evidence of underlying motivation for design alternative not relevant); Cunningham v.
Yazoo Mfg. Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 498, 500, 350 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1976) (evidence of post-
occurrence design change relevant and material to question of feasible design alternative
available to manufacturer in products liability action); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80
Wis. 2d 91, 100-01, 258 N.W.2d 680, 684 (1977) (economic realities will set course of mass pro-
ducer's conduct and not evidentiary rule allowing admission of subsequent conduct
evidence); ME. R. EvID. 407(a) (1976) (declaring evidence of subsequent measures taken after
event admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct).
" See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting split among
federal courts). Some federal courts have found Rule 407 acts to exclude subsequent repair
evidence. See, e.g., id. at 60 (distinction insufficient between strict liability and negligence
to admit subsequent repair evidence); Oberst v. International Harv. Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866
(7th Cir. 1980) (subsequent repair evidence admitted to show alternative design feasibility
only if controverted); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1980) (rejecting
agreement that Rule 407 does not apply in strict liability). Other federal courts have found
Rule 407 does not apply in actions founded upon strict liability to exclude subsequent repair
evidence. See, e.g., Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rule 407 inap-
plicable to actions based on strict liability); Robbtns v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rule 407 confined to cases involving negligence or
other culpable conduct).
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actions based on strict liability stems from the paucity of congressional
intent or other extrinsic guidance.4 3 The legislative history of the
Federal Rules of Evidence reveals that Rule 407 was neither the subject
of floor debate, nor of discussion during the course of committee hear-
ings on the Rules in the House of Representatives.44 The Rule enacted by
Congress was the Rule prescribed by the Supreme Court without
change. 4' The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 407 also is
silent regarding whether Rule 407 bars evidence of post-accident
remedial measures in a strict liability case.46
Absent discernible congressional intent, the applicability of Rule 407
to a strict liability action depends in part upon the relevancy of the
evidence of remedial measures to the action. Advocates for the position
that strict liability requires no Rule 407 exclusion have challenged the
traditional rationale that subsequent repair evidence is irrelevant in
strict liability actions.1 Courts and commentators argue that in strict
liability, when the character of the defendant's product is the essential
issue,4" evidence of subsequent repair often is relevant.49 As a reflection
'3 See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14, at 180 (little evidence of what drafters of
Rule 407 intended). But see Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980). In
Werner the Fourth Circuit construed the inclusion of "culpable conduct" within the
language of Rule 407 as congressional intent that Rule 407 should apply in strict liability ac-
tions. See id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that from a policy standpoint if Rule 407 excludes
evidence of subsequent repairs to prove culpable conduct the same should be true for strict
liability. Id. at 857. Stating its reasoning alternatively the court found that if Congress ex-
cluded subsequent repair evidence on the issue of culpable conduct, the result should be no
different on policy grounds on the issue of strict liability. Id.; see Remedial Measures, supra
note 30, at 677-78.
" See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, at 407-1.
"s Note by Federal Judicial Center, FED. R. EVID. 407. Between 1965 and 1969 an Ad-
visory Committee composed of judges, lawyers, and teachers developed a preliminary draft
of proposed rules of evidence for use in the federal courts, accompanied by detailed Ad-
visory Committee notes. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [19341
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7052. After circulation and revision of the proposed
rules Chief Justice Warren Burger transmitted them to Congress. Id. Congress revised the
proposed rules, and adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence by legislative enactment on Jan.
2, 1975, which became effective 180 days after enactment. See Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
" See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 407.
, See, e.g., Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (1976) (admission
of recall letters relevant to show defect); Products Liability, supra note 10, at 847 (evidence
of subsequent repairs relevant in products liability case to prove reasonably attainable safe-
ty standard); Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 24, at 802 (proof of post-occurrence change
relevant to demonstrate manufacturer's capability of creating safer product).
" See text accompanying note 36 supra.
" See, e.g., Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 172-73 (subsequent repair
evidence relevant in strict liability to prove feasibility and adequacy of warning); Products
Liability, supra note 10, at 846-47 (evidence of subsequent repair relevant in strict liability
to prove manufacturer's control and to establish legal defectiveness of product). Examples
of subsequent repair evidence which may be relevant in a strict liability context are recall
letters sent to consumers by manufacturers, now a commonplace occurrence in American
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of the character of the product, evidence of subsequent modifications can
be highly probative in strict liability cases.50 Strict liability requires as
an element of proof a defect in the product that is either unreasonably
dangerous or that renders the product unmerchantable5 Evidence of
subsequent repair often is relevant to prove a reasonably attainable
safety standard, which the trier of fact may establish by comparing the
improved or changed product with the allegedly defective product.2
Despite the possible relevancy of subsequent repair evidence in
some strict liability actions, relevancy alone is not determinative of the
application of Rule 407 to exclude the evidence. The Advisory Commit-
economic life. See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 158 (noting that campaigns to
recall defective products are common in American economy); Ramp, The Impact of Recall
Campaigns on Products Liability, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 83, 83 (1977) (predicting in any given
year over 25 million products will be recalled). When a plaintiff seeks recovery under strict
liability for the very issue which is the subject of a recall letter, the letter has high pro-
bative value in determining the manufacturer's liability. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra
note 2, 407 [03], at 407-15. The question of a recall letter's admissibility in a strict liability
action has arisen in suits against automobile manufacturers, where recall notices help to
determine whether a defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control.
See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 159 n.5. Most courts, when faced with recall
letter evidence in a strict liability action, have admitted the recall letter when relevant to
the defect that the defendant is attempting to establish. See, e.g., Longnecker v. General
Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979) (no Rule 407 objection raised); Carey v.
General Motors Corp., 377 Mass. 736, 744, 387 N.E.2d 583, 588 (Mass. 1979) (where plaintiff
independently proves defect that was subject matter of recall in vehicle at time of accident
recall letter admissible as part of plaintiffs proof against manufacturer); Manieri v.
Volkswagenwerk A.G., 151 N.J. Super. 422, 431, 376 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1977) (recall letters
clearly relevant on issue of whether defect arose while vehicle in control of defendant, were
admissible with a limiting instruction by trial judge); Iadicicco v. Duffy, 60 A.D.2d 905, 906,
401 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559-60 (1978) (trial court exclusion of recall notice improper); Barry v.
Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 877 (1976) (recall letters admissible, but admis-
sion must weigh against possible prejudice); Fields v. Volkswagen, 555 P.2d 48, 58 (Okla.
1976) (recall letter by itself does not make prima facie case or shift burden of proof, but if
defect that is subject of recall letter contributed or caused accident then letter would be
evidence of defect existing at time product left manufacturer and would be admissible). But
see Vockie v. General Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 57, 62 (E.D. Pa.), affd mem., 523 F.2d 1052 (3d
Cir. 1975) (where recall notice mandated by government regulation, public policy requires
that manufacturers not be inhibited in making unqualified disclosure of potential safety
hazard in good faith effort to comply with statutory duty).
10 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 624 P.2d 790, 794 (Alaska 1981).
s, See RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 402A(4); U.C.C. § 2-314 (1972).
See Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974) (post-accident change
evidence relevant and admissible to establish required standard of safety); Gasteiger v.
Gillenwater, 57 Tenn. App. 206, 213-14, 417 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1966) (jury allowed to use
evidence of subsequent repairs to determine if repairs met minimum industry standards);
Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 173; Products Liability, supra note 10, at 850. Rele-
vant evidence is defined by Fed. R. Evid. 401 as evidence that has any tendency to make the
existence of a material fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. FED. R. EVID. 401. To be relevant under this definition, the evidence need not prove
or even make more probable the ultimate proposition for which it is offered. See SALTZBURG
& REDDEN, supra note 14, at 85.
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tee's Note accompanying Rule 407 acknowledges that by itself the
relevancy consideration is insufficient to support exclusion of subse-
quent repair evidence. 3 Courts and commentators generally recognize
public policy as the controlling ground for excluding evidence of subse-
quent repair in negligence actions. 4 Similarly, public policy can support
the exclusion of. subsequent repair evidence in strict liability actions.5
Many courts56 that have admitted evidence of subsequent repair in
strict liability actions have been persuaded by the public policy analysis
of the California Supreme Court in Ault v. International Harvester Co."
In Ault, the Supreme Court of California, whose opinions were among
the first to accept and employ the concept of strict liability, s held
California's statute excluding evidence of subsequent repair59 inap-
plicable to strict products liability.6" The plaintiff in Ault sustained in-
juries in an accident involving an automobile manufactured by Interna-
tional Harvester, and brought suit alleging that a defect in the gearbox
design of the vehicle caused the accident.' On appeal from a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court held that the trial court pro-
perly admitted evidence of a change in the gearbox design under Section
1151 of the California evidence code." The majority opinion justified its
holding on two grounds. 3 First, the majority held Section 1151 inap-
plicable to a strict liability case because proof of "negligence or culpable
53 See Advisory Committee's Note, FED. R. EVID. 407.
' See note 23 supra.
I See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980) (stating that to resolve
whether Rule 407 excludes subsequent repair evidence court must examine policy behind
Rule 407 and common law rule).
I See Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 527 n.17 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins v. Farmers
Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1977); Abel v. J.C. Penney Co., 488
F. Supp. 891, 896 (D. Minn. 1980) (dictum); Roberts v. May, 583 P.2d 305, 309 (Colo. App.
1978); Goods v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 78, 565 P.2d 217, 224 (1977); Caprara v.
Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515, 521, 423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697-98 (1979) (appeal pending); Barry
v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 7-10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875-76 (1976); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 61
S.D. , __ 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7 (1976); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis.
2d 91, 101, 258 N.W.2d 680, 683 (1977).
13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1974).
See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, -, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1967); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d
436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, C.J., concurring).
, See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
See Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 118, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150-51, 117
Cal. Rptr. 812, 814-15 (1974). The foundation of a products liability suit is the theory of strict
liability in tort or implied warranty. See Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991,
995 (D. N.D. 1966), affd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons,
145 Miss. 876, 882, 111 So. 305, 306 (1927); Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 253 S.W.2d
532, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); RESTATEMENT, supra note 30, § 402A. See also U.C.C. § 2-314(1)
(1979).
6, 13 Cal. 3d at 116, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
62 Id. at 117, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
See text accompanying notes 64 & 65 infra.
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conduct" on the part of the manufacturer is not necessary under strict
liability theory.64 Second, the majority determined the public policy foun-
dation supporting Section 1151 of encouraging post-injury repair was in-
applicable in the products liability field because manufacturers' self-
interest in effecting repairs provides sufficient incentive without the
rule excluding subsequent repair evidence. 5 The reasoning of the ma-
jority opinion is relevant to a consideration of Rule 407 because of the
Rule's similarity to Section 1151.66
In determining that the language "negligence or culpable conduct"
in Section 1151 does not encompass strict liability, the California
Supreme Court relied upon an interpretation of the section's legislative
history.67 The legislative history, however, does not explicitly indicate
whether Section 1151 applies to strict liability." By contrast, a federal
circuit court interpretation of the same "negligence and culpable con-
duct" language in Rule 407 determined that the United States Congress
intended the Rule to exclude evidence of subsequent repair in strict
liability actions."9 The disparate holdings illustrate the inevitability of
conflicting statutory interpretations achieved when starting from am-
biguous legislative histories," and highlight the need to examine public
policy considerations.
An examination of public policy provided the basis of the Ault
court's second rationale.7 ' In finding the public policy of encouraging
post-accident repair inapplicable in strict products liability, the Ault ma-
jority relied on two arguments. 2 The majority asserted that a mass pro-
ducer of defectively designed products has sufficient incentive to take
remedial action in the threat of numerous potential lawsuits arising from
the uncorrected defect."' The court reasoned that the manufacturer's or
' See 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
See id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
See CAL. EvID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966). Section 1151 of the California Evidence
Code is comparable to Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Advisory Committee's
Note, FED. R.-EVID. 407. By its terms § 1151 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial or
precautionary measures when a plaintiff offers the evidence to prove negligence or culpable
conduct. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966).
7 See 13 Cal. 3d at 121, 528 P.2d at 1152-53, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816-17 (limitation of §
1151 to negligence causes of action deemed deliberate action on part of legislature and Law
Revision Commission which drafted § 1151).
" See Death Knell, supra note 10, at 217-21. One commentator reviewed all relevant
legislative materials in regard to adoption of the California Evidence Code and concluded
that the legislative history yields no clear expression of legislative intent on the applicability
of § 1151 to strict products liability. See id. at 221.
69 See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980); Remedial Measures,
supra note 30, at 678. See also text accompanying note 43 supra.
7o See Death Knell, supra note 10, at 221.
' See 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
72 See text accompanying notes 73 & 74 infra.
" See 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16. The Ault majority
further reasoned that a failure to correct possibly would produce adverse publicity for the
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producer's economic self-interest lies in improving or repairing defective
products. 4 The Ault majority also argued that the application of Section
1151 to strict liability actions would be contrary to the public policy of
encouraging the mass producer to market safer products in making
recovery for the injured plaintiff more difficult. 5 Excluding evidence of
subsequent repair to encourage future remedial action may preclude
recovery under strict liability theory, which was itself designed to en-
sure safety in marketed products. 6
The Ault court's reasoning has persuaded many courts,"
legislatures, and commentators. 8 Ault and its supporters point to the
policy of encouraging repair underlying the exclusion of subsequent
remedial activity evidence in negligence actions and argue its ineffec-
tiveness in a strict liability context. With the admission of subsequent
repair evidence the producer trades one case in which the court admits
such evidence, .against an unknown but potentially large liability if the
producer continues to manufacture and market the defective goods."
Additionally, by failing to repair or correct when he has knowledge of a
defect or hazard, a defendant manufacturer runs the risk that a subse-
quent plaintiff will use the failure to show the manufacturer's
negligence' or to build the basis of a punitive damage claim."
mass producer. See id. at 120,528 P.2d at 1152,117 Cal. Rptr. at 816. The activities of watchdog
consumer organizations and federal agencies present additional incentive to take remedial
measures. See Products Liability, supra note 10, at 848-49.
" See 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
" See id. at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
" See id. n.4., 528 P.2d at 1152 n.4, 117 Cal Rptr. at 816 n.4 (quoting with approval Pro-
ducts Liability, supra note 10, at 848-50).
" See note 56 supra. Contra, Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th
Cir. 1980) (Rule 407 expressly forbids use of subsequent measures to show design changed
to remedy defect); Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 464, 266 A.2d 140, 141
(1970) (subsequent remedial measures not evidential in relation to issues of either
negligence or strict liability).
7 See, e.g., ME. R. EVID. 407 (evidence of subsequent remedial measures admissible for
any legitimate purpose including negligence actions); OKLA. R. EVID. 407 (specifically allow-
ing subsequent repair evidence in strict liability cases); Wyo. R. EVID. 407 (same); Post-
Accident Repairs, supra note 15, at 491; LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 189 & n.21.
Contra, MICH. R. EVID. 407 (Advisory Committee noting Ault with disapproval, stating Rule
interpreted to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability
cases); Death Knell, supra note 10, at 224.
,1 See Robbins v. Farmers Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 792-93 (8th Cir. 1977);
Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 120, 528 P.2d at 1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816;
Products Liability, supra note 10, at 847-48.
" See Lloyd, supra note 6, at 409-10; Products Liability, supra note 10, at 848-49. Con-
tra, Rothstein, supra note 14, at 114.3. Manufacturers will not remedy mass-produced goods
if a plaintiff can use the manufacturers' remedial activities as evidence against the manufac-
turers. Id.
" See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 407 [02], at 407-10; Schwartz, supra note
2, at 6.
82 See Note, Punitive Damages in Mass Marketed Product Litigation, 14 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 405, 408 (1981). In a strict liability and negligence action against Ford Motor Company
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A further argument against excluding subsequent repair evidence
under Rule 407 is that the rule is unlikely to achieve its ostensible objec-
tive because it is subject to so many exceptions. 3 Much evidence that
otherwise would be barred by Rule 407 enters through one of its excep-
tions. 4 Rule 407 admits evidence of subsequent remedial measures to
prove the feasibility of such measures, but only if the defendant con-
troverts feasibility." If plaintiffs counsel can maneuver a defendant's
witness into suggesting that alternative designs were impractical, or
that the defendant's place or product was as safe as possible, then a
court would receive the subsequent repair evidence to impeach or show
feasibility. With Rule 407 subject to so many exceptions, plaintiffs
often will find a justification for introducing evidence of subsequent
repairs.87 Indeed, some commentators have characterized the general
rule excluding evidence of post-accident repair or change as one favoring
admissibility except when offered solely to prove a defendant's
negligence or culpable conduct.8
Despite the porous nature of Rule 407, forceful arguments for ex-
cluding evidence of subsequent repair in strict liability cases remain.
Evidence of subsequent repair, though in some cases not probative of a
product being unreasonably dangerous or unmerchantable, may become
so in the eyes of juries incapable of limiting the evidence to its proper
use. 9 As the dissenting opinion in Ault makes clear, changes in a product
where Ford had 29 prior reports of a defective throttle, the fact that Ford issued no warn-
ings to dealers or customers was sufficient to impose punitive damages. See Rinker v. Ford
Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 667-68 (Mo. App. 1978). In a growing number of jurisdictions
damage suits have coupled strict liability of manufacturers with the application of the doc-
trine of punitive damages. See Note, Punitive Damage Awards in Strict Product Liability
Litigation: The Doctrine, The Debate, The Defense, 42 0HIO ST. L.J. 771, 771 (1981).
See Oberst v. International Harv. Co., 640 F.2d 863, 870 (7th Cir. 1980) (exceptions to
rule make exclusion uncertain). Courts admitting subsequent repair evidence in strict pro-
ducts liability cases generally rely upon an exception to the negligence exclusionary rule.
See, e.g., Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Mfg. Co., 490 F.2d 229, 232 (7th Cir. 1973) (post-accident
design change evidence admissible on issue of available alternative design feasibility);
Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969) (post-accident
changes admissible in either negligence or strict liability action to demonstrate duty to
repair product); Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 156.
" See WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 407 [02], at 407-10; text accompanying
notes 27-30 supra.
" See Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848, 853 (4th Cir. 1980); FED. R. EVID. 407; Kennelly,
supra note 2, at 78.
8, See Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 8 Cal. 2d 655, 664, 313 P.2d 557, 563 (1957)
(when defense witness induced to state that equipment in question safest available then
court allowed in subsequent remedial activity evidence to impeach); WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
supra note 2, 407 [02], at 407-11; Rossi, The Ban on Evidence of Subsequent Remedial
Measures: Why Does It Survive?, 7 CORNELL L.F. 6, 7 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rossi].
See Products Liability, supra note 10, at 845.
See Lloyd, supra note 6, at 402; Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 845.
See, e.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, __ Ind. App. ..
388 N.E.2d 541, 561 (1979) (jury influenced by hindsight evidence might apply artificially
high standard of care); Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 126, 528 P.2d 1148,
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frequently result from reasons unrelated to the remedial nature of the
change." Evidence of subsequent repair, however, potentially is pre-
judicial in nature when used against a manufacturer defendant." One
commentator has argued that the trier of fact cannot construe the
evidence as an admission of the defendant's negligence because
negligence is not an issue under a strict liability claim.9' While this
reasoning logically is faultless, jurors may inject the issue of fault or
culpable conduct even when fault is not theoretically an issue. Admis-
sion of subsequent repair evidence, therefore, runs the risk of jury
misuse.94
A further problem of admitting subsequent repair evidence in strict
liability actions arises whenever a plaintiff brings an action in both
negligence and strict liability. 5 Admission of subsequent repair evidence
1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 820 (1978) (Clark, J., dissenting) (juries may conclude change
reflects admission of defect and give great weight to perceived admission); Products Liabili-
ty, supra note 10, at 850-51.
" Ault v. International Harv. Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 125-26, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr.
at 820 (Clark, J., dissenting) (change in product frequently made for reasons including
desires to decrease production costs or to increase efficiency or salability); Kennelly, supra
note 2, at 78; text accompanying notes 19 & 20 supra.
91 See Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (evidence of
subsequent remedial activity such as manufacturer's design change extremely damaging in
jury case); 13 Cal. 3d at 126, 528 P.2d at 1156, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Clark J., dissenting) (in
heat of product liability trials jury learning of subsequent change may give decisive weight
to perceived admission of defect). The Ault dissent points out that in the first trial the jury
could not reach a verdict, but the second trial, in which plaintiffs counsel constantly em-
phasized the defendant's remedial measure, resulted in a verdict for $700,000. 13 Cal. 3d at
128, 528 P.2d at 1157, 117 Cal Rptr. at 821 (Clark, J., dissenting).
" See Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 3, at 172-73.
" See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, - Ind. App. 388
N.E.2d 541, 561 (1979); Rothstein, supra note 14, at 114; WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note
2, 407[03] at 407-14; Products Liability, supra note 10, at 850.
"' See Kobayashi, Products Liability Lawsuits: Admissibility Questions and
Miscellaneous Evidentiary Developments-Part 1, 25 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 297, 299 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Kobayashi]. Subsequent repair evidence, once admitted is highly per-
suasive, although not necessarily probative, and can be the basis for unduly prejudicial and
erroneous inferences by the jury. Id. Two commentators writing together have changed
their opinion regarding admissibility of subsequent repair evidence in strict liability actions,
in a recent edition of the commentaries on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Compare S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 165 (2d ed. 1977) (ad-
vocating abandonment of exclusionary rule to allow admission of subsequent repair
evidence in products liability actions) with S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 181-82 (3d ed. 1982) (Rule 407 and common law progenitor defensible as
means to avoid jury confusion). The basis of the commentators' present opinion that Rule
407 and its common law progenitor make good sense is that a jury possibly is incapable of
making proper use of subsequent repair evidence. See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14,
at 181-82.
"' See, e.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 56 (2d Cir. 1981) (action on negligence,
breach of warranty, and strict liability); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 231
(6th Cir. 1980) (action brought in negligence, strict liability and breach of implied warranty);
Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d 1, 2, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (1976) (action based upon
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on a strict liability count in a suit combining strict liability and
negligence claims might undermine the congressional mandate in Rule
407 to exclude such evidence as proof of negligence." Additionally, many
trial lawyers, commentators, and courts believe that proof offered on a
strict liability theory is much the same as that offered on a negligence
theory. For example, the products liability area of defective design con-
tains elements of both negligence and strict liability. 8 Admission of
subsequent repair evidence in strict products liability actions that re-
quire proof similar to a showing of negligence potentially conflicts with
the common law and Rule 407 requirement that such evidence not be ad-
mitted to show negligence or culpable conduct.9
negligence and breach of warranty). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states that strict
liability in tort is not to be an exclusive remedy for personal injury. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 16, § 402A, Comment a.
9 See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1980) (admission of subse-
quent repair evidence in case with both strict liability and negligence claims might override
Rule 407).
" See, e.g., Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 367 Mass. 70, 83-84, 323 N.E.2d
876, 882-83 (1975) (discussing difficulty in determining whether standard of care should be
strict liability or negligence in action for damage to property from collapsing wall); Micalief
v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 386, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (1976) (ar-
ticulating reasonable care standard that resembles simple negligence standard); Howes v.
Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 274-75, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976) discussing difficulty in deter-
mining whether standard of care should be strict liability or negligence); Rothstein, supra
note 14, at 114 (many trial lawyers believe proof for strict liability same as for negligence);
Subsequent Repair Doctrine, supra note 10, at 496 (reasonable care in defective design stan-
dard much like simple negligence standard).
" See, e.g., Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 818, 829, 393 N.E.2d 598,
606 (1979) (defect design area of products liability one in which concepts of negligence and
fault remain pertinent); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 292-93, 436
N.Y.S.2d 480, 484 n.3 (1981) (firmer liability foundation than strict liability required for
design defect cases); SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14, at 180 (proving defective design
not much different from proving negligence). One court reviewing a design defect case ruled
reversible error the admission of evidence of a manufacturer's subsequent repair, noting
that the manufacturer's liability for a design defect is determined by the reasonable man
test used in negligence actions. Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 71 A.D.2d 429, 435, 422 N.Y.S.2d
969, 973-74 (1979). The court reasoned that when the plaintiffs claim centered on defective
design rather than a manufacturing defect evidence of subsequent remedial measures was
inadmissible except as provided by the traditional exceptions to the rule excluding subse-
quent repair evidence. Id. at 437, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 974-75. But see Chart v. General Motors
Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 103-04, 258 N.W.2d 680, 684 (trial court did not err in admitting subse-
quent repair evidence in design defect cases). Another tort area in which courts are divided
regarding whether a standard of strict liability or negligence applies is in claims arising
from a defendant's inadequate warning of a dangerous condition. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628
F.2d 848, 858 (distinction between strict liability and negligence lessens considerably in
failure to warn cases). Compare Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 208, 311 N.W.2d
219, 224 (1981) (because duty to warn emphasizes manufacturer's conduct rule excluding
subsequent repair evidence to prove culpable conduct renders manufacturer's revised pro-
duct warnings inadmissible) with Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d
788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977) (upholding trial court admission of subsequent repair evidence in
strict liability action involving defendant's failure to warn).
" See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
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The genesis of the common law rule excluding evidence of subse-
quent repair occurred in negligence actions."' Rule 407 embodies the ex-
clusionary rule which at common law was uniform. 1 ' The public policy
and relevancy justifications for barring subsequent repair evidence lost
much vitality with the relatively recent advent of strict liability
theory,"2 the result of which is that within the context of strict liability
actions some courts find the justifications unpersuasive while others
continue to apply the traditional rule.0 3 Although excluding subsequent
repair evidence can no longer rest upon public policy and relevancy ra-
tionales,' prejudice or jury confusion becomes a consideration which in
some circumstances revives the need to exclude subsequent repair
evidence.101
One means with which to treat the problem of prejudice or jury con-
fusion is the use of instructions issued to the jury by the presiding
judge.' In the abstract, evidence may be admissible for one purpose and
inadmissible for another. 7 Arguably, jury instructions allow for admis-
sion of such evidence but confine its use to prove only permissible in-
ferences.' Courts and commentators have noted, however, that cau-
tionary and limiting instructions provide only limited utility in aiding
proper jury deliberations. 9 Instructions can serve to further confuse a
jury," or call the jury's attention to impermissible inferences."1 Jury in-
structions, though in some instances useful and appropriate,"2 do not
provide a comprehensive solution.
10 See Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 302; Products Liability, supra note 10, at 840.
ll See Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 302; text accompanying note 2 supra.
10 See PROSSER, supra note 8, § 75, at 494. Professor Prosser indicates that liability
without fault has developed over the last hundred years. See id.; Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1099-1114 (1960)
(tracing development of strict liability theory). Another commentator traces liability
without negligence back over the past several decades. See Renovated Repair Rule, supra
note 3, at 149.
103 See text accompanying notes 38-42 supra.
I" See text accompanying notes 50-52 & 79-82 supra.
101 See text accompanying note 120 infra.
I0 See Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (ordering
new trial for trial court's failure to issue limiting instructions about evidence of design
change after accident).
1 Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980).
10 Id.; Products Liability, supra note 10, at 850-51.
10 See Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1980); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp.,
52 N.Y.2d 114, 417 N.E.2d 545, 556, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 261-62 (1981); LEMPERT & SALTZBURG,
supra note 2, at 141; Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 346.
"I See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1981) (judgment reversed
and remanded because of confusing special verdict questions on issues of negligence and
strict liability). But see note 112 infra.
.. See LEMPERT & SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 141 (attorneys sometimes waive right to
limiting instructions for fear will call jury's attention to impermissible inferences).
1l2 See Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 387, 482 P.2d 681, 686-87, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 769, 775-76 (1971) (in many instances instructions on negligence helpful to jury and not
confusing).
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While the possibility of unfair prejudice from the use of subsequent
repair evidence and the difficulties posed by mixed claims of negligence
and strict liability are valid problems, the currently existing Federal
Rules offer solutions. Rule 402 bars evidence that is irrelevant."' Rule
403 bars evidence when its unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value."' In conjunction, Rules 402 and 403 can render Rule 407
superfluous by excluding subsequent repair evidence without ever
reaching Rule 407.115
Using Rule 402, a court faced with the admissibility of subsequent
repair evidence should ask whether the evidence is relevant under the
substantive law.' 6 If relevant, other evidence already admitted or ad-
missible might be subject to less jury misuse.' Under Rule 403 the
judge may exclude the evidence altogether if it is unfairly prejudicial."8
The advantage of treating evidence of subsequent repair as governed by
Rule 402 and 403 is the discretion the judge may exercise to treat each
case and situation involving strict liability and subsequent repair
evidence appropriately.'
With the discretion that Rules 402 and 403 permit, judges can be
more responsive to the numerous factual postures in which evidence of
subsequent repairs can arise. Thus, in strict liability actions that require
proof akin to a negligence standard a judge can exclude subsequent
repair evidence if either irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial without resort-
ing to Rule 407.20 When subsequent remedial activity, such as a recall
"S FED. R. EviD. 402.
... FED. R. EVID. 403.
"I Rothstein, supra note 14, at 114.3.
"' Id.
, Id. Before admitting evidence of subsequent repair a judge should be satisfied that
the plaintiff cannot establish conveniently the fact to be inferred by other less prejudicial
proof. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 668; SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14, at 101.
When considering admission of subsequent repair evidence a judge should balance the pre-
judicial effect of the evidence against the plaintiffs ability to prove a case without such
evidence. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 133, 417 N.E.2d 545, 557, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981) (Jasen, Jones, and Meyer, J.J., dissenting); Death Knell, supra note 10,
at 227-28.
"' See Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir. 1981) (Rule 403 requires court to
consider whether danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of subsequent remedial activity
evidence outweighs probative value); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87,
94 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 344 (defendant can use admission of
subsequent repair evidence for persuasive arguments of variety of inferences, many of
which improper in context of products liability); State Variations, supra note 10, at 341
(balancing test of Rule 403 justifies exclusion of prejudicial subsequent remedial measure
evidence).
"1 See Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 92 (3d Cir. 1975) (no abuse of discretion
under Rule 403 in excluding evidence of subsequent repairs); Barry v. Manglass, 55 A.D.2d
1, 10, 389 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (1976) (relevance of recall letters outweighs any prejudice in let-
ters' receipt); Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 483, 573 P.2d 785, 791
(1978) (fundamental problems in weighing relevance of subsequent change against potential
prejudice in given factual setting).
12 See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
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campaign, occurs as a result of a statutory requirement12 or agency
directive'22 a judge can determine that evidence of the remedial activity
has minimum probative value because the activity was compelled."3
When a plaintiff's action includes both strict liability and negligence
claims, a judge can offer a limiting instruction to the jury, if
appropriate,'2 4 or exclude the repair evidence completely.
25
A possible criticism of using a Rule 402 and 403 approach in place of
Rule 407 will be that it will not exclude the same amount of material as
an expanded Rule 407. Judges tend to decide doubtful questions of
relevance and unfair prejudice on the side of admissibility.2 ' However,
increased admissibility of subsequent repair evidence in strict liability
claims is consistent with the general policy of allowing convenient
recovery for an injured consumer underlying the theory of strict liability.'17
The reluctance of some courts to admit evidence of subsequent repairs in
a strict liability context may reflect a desire to limit convenient recovery,
rather than the more often expressed rationale of encouraging safety
... See 15 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976) (requiring notification of buyers by auto manufacturer of
finding of defect).
" See id. § 1412 (authorizing Secretary of Transportation to order auto manufacturers
to furnish notification of a defect or to remedy a defect).
" See Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, , 386 A.2d 816, 836 (1978)
(exclusionary rule should apply to products actions when measures required by official
order); Kobayashi, supra note 94, at 349 (involuntariness of automobile recall letters re-
quired by statute may affect admissibility).
".. See Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980) (new trial
ordered for failure of judge to offer limiting instruction); text accompanying notes 106-112
supra.
" See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra. Alternatively, if a court admits subse-
quent repair evidence the court can allow the defendant to explain the rationale for the
repair. Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 818, 829, 393 N.E.2d 598, 606 (1979)
(evidence of reason for subsequent change improperly excluded when relevant to rebut
possible admission of liability).
" See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 14, at 96 & 101 (under Rule 401 judges appear
to decide doubtful questions of relevance on side of admissibility; under Rule 403 if pro-
bative value of evidence balances closely with its prejudicial effect judge should admit).
" See note 8 supra. Strict liability has made recovery easier by eliminating the need to
prove negligence. Id. Under a strict liability theory a plaintiff may recover for damages
caused by a defective or dangerous product even though he was not in privity with the
defendant producer and has not established the defendant's departure from a reasonable
standard of care. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962) (manufacturer strictly liable when article he places on market
knowing inspection for defect will not precede use proves to have injury causing defect);
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,413,161 A.2d 69,100 (1969) (lack of privity
does not prevent injury suit against defendant); RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 402A(2)(a) &
(b). One commentator has argued that admissibility of subsequent repair evidence in pro-
ducts liability cases has the overall effect of expanding liability. See Anderson, Subsequent
Remedial Conduct: A No Win Situation? 23 For Def. 14, 20 (August, 1981) (abandoning
subsequent remedial conduct rule in products liability cases is a policy determination
resulting in expanded recovery in products cases).
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precautions." In an action designed to tip the recovery balance in favor
of the plaintiff, courts' exclusion of subsequent repair evidence through
Rule 407 acts as an unwarranted counterweight." To be sure, the doc-
trine of strict liability does not make manufacturers or sellers absolute
insurers for all physical harm which occurs during use of the product,"'
nor should strict liability imply absolute liability."' With Rules 402 and
403 in place to protect against irrelevant and prejudicial subsequent
repair evidence, Rule 407 becomes unnecessary in a strict liability set-
ting.132 In keeping with the policy underlying strict liability the plaintiff
should be free to introduce all relevant, non-prejudicial evidence in a
strict liability suit without having to overcome the hurdle of Rule 407.
MATTHEW L. KIMBALL
12 See Rossi, supra note 86, at 9; cf. Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 87 Wis. 2d
882, 902, 275 N.W.2d 915, 924 (1979) (recommending that legislature review problem of open
ended product liability).
' See Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 24, at 813.
13 See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 863 (5th Cir. 1967) (manufac-
turers not absolute insurers for all physical harm which occurs during use of product);
Simien v. S.S. Kresge Co., 566 F.2d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 1978) (doctrine of strict liability not in-
tended to make sellers absolute insurers for all physical harm from use of product).
131 See Howes v. Deere & Co., 71 Wis. 2d 268, 273, 238 N.W.2d 76, 80 (1976) (strict
liability does not impose absolute liability); Rothstein, supra note 14, at 114 (same).
,"2 See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 2, 407 [02], at 407-11 & 12 (preferable to
abolish Rule 407 and treat subsequent repair evidence under general principles of relevancy,
relying on Rule 403 for guidance).
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